Ray Jackendoff, 1997
Preface
Chapter 1. Questions, Goals, Assumptions
1.1 Universal Grammar
1.2 Necessities and Assumptions
1.3 Syntactocentrism and Perfection
Chapter 2. Interfaces; Representational Modularity
2.1 The "Articulatory-Perceptual" Interfaces
2.2 The Phonology-Syntax Interface
2.3 The Conceptual-Intentional Interface
2.4 Embedding Mismatches between Syntactic Structure and Conceptual Structure
2.5 The Tripartite Parallel Interface
2.6 Representational Modularity
Chapter 3. More on the Syntax-Semantics Interface
3.1 Enriched Composition
3.2 Aspectual Coercions
There is a similar coercion in conversions between mass and count nouns
imposed by specific pragmatic situations. However, these are restricted
to cases of food or drink and do not appear to generalize beyond that.
3.3 Reference Transfer Functions
Each of these three types of semantic modification are taken as examples
of the semantic influence of .. (enrichment), which Chomsky argues
must be semantically isolated.
This last comment is not well stated. Clean it up.
3.4 Argument Structure Alternations
3.5 Adjective-Noun Modification
3.6 Summary
3.7 Anaphora
3.8 Quantification
3.9 Remarks
Chapter 4. The Lexical Interface
4.1 Lexical Insertion versus Lexical Licensing
4.2 PIL = CIL
4.3 PIL and CIL Are at S-Structure
4.4 Checking Argument Structure
4.5 Remarks on Processing
4.6 The Lexicon in a More General Mental Ecology
Chapter 5. Lexical Entries, Lexical Rules
5.1 Broadening the Conception of the Lexicon
5.2 Morphosyntax versus Morphophonology
5.3 Inflexional versus Derivational Morphology
5.4 Productivity versus Semiproductivity
5.5 Psycholinguistic Considerations
5.6 "Optimal Coding" of Semiproductive Forms
5.7 Final Remarks
Chapter 6. Remarks on Productive Morphology
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Place of Traditional Morphophonology
6.3 Phonological and Class-Based Allomorphy
6.4 Suppletion of Composed Forms by Irregulars
6.5 The Status of Zero Inflections
6.6 Why the Lexicon Cannot Be Minimalist
Chapter 7. Idioms and Other Fixed Expressions
7.1 Review of the Issues
7.2 The Wheel of Fortune Corpus: If It Isn't Lexical, What Is It?
7.3 Lexical Insertion of Idioms as X0s
7.4 Lexical Licensing of Units Larger Than X0
7.5 Parallels between Idioms and Compounds
7.6 Syntactic Mobility of (Only) Some Idioms
7.7 Idioms That Are Specializations of Other Idiomatic Constructions
7.8 Relation to Construction Grammar
7.9 Summary
Chapter 8. Epilogue: How Language Helps Us Think
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Brain Phenomena Opaque To Awareness
8.3 Language Is Not Thought and Vice Versa
8.4 Phonetic Form Is Conscious, Thought Is Not
8.5 The Significance of Consciousness Again
8.6 First Way Language Helps Us Think: Linguistic Communication
8.7 Second Way Language Helps Us Think: Making Conceptual Structure Available for Attention
8.8 Third Way Language Helps Us Think: Valuation of Conscious Percepts
Jackendoff initially states that this book is a rehash of his 1987
Consciousness and the Computational Mind, but then proceeds
to list a huge number of modifications and alterations since that book.
"The present study is an attempt to renovate
the foundations of linguistic theory".
While Jackendoff asserts that this book is "down to its deepest core
a part of the Chomskian tradition", he also states that this involves
"the way a human being understands and uses language".
Those goals have not always been a part of Generative Linguistics.
This book will not be concerned with social aspects of language use
and it will generally assume that discourse and narrative issues are
independent of sentential issues. It will not be overly formal.
It is clear that children need something beyond general intelligence to
acquire language. This extra something we call Universal Grammar.
That this UG must be innate has made waves across many disciplines.
Are UG "rules" represented in the brain a)not at all,
b) indirectly, as interpretive data, or c) directly as procedural structure?
Chomsky identifies three interfaces the grammatical computational system
must have. These are 1) articulatory and perceptual systems, 2) the
conceptual/intentional system, and 3) the lexicon. These interfaces are
considered to be conceptual necessities of the theory. Among a
number of additional assumptions, he includes that the system performs
derivations, that it can substitute one string for another, that
lexical items are combined by merging to build up phrase structures,
that lexical items are inserted into the phrase structures, and that the
grammar is nonredundant, entirely optimally coded.
Two further Chomskian assumptions present greater problems for Jackendoff.
One, that syntax is the fundamental component of the system, Jackendoff
refers to as syntactocentrism. He takes this opportunity to review a
number of problems with several of the assumptions of Chomskian theory
and, in particular, very cautiously introduces his view that the study
of language must, to some extent, concern itself with the real workings
of language rather merely describing the observable structures.
He sums up a final assumption, that language approximates a perfect system,
by his interpretation of a Chomskian view that "language could be
perfect if only we didn't have to talk".
This chapter looks more closely at the articulator/perceptual and conceptual
interfaces, aguing that they play larger roles in the language system than
the Chomskian view would support. Jackendoff then presents his conception
of Representational Modularity.
Jackendoff argues that
In the sentence "The light flashed until dawn",
an interrupted temporal sequence is understood which is not
contained in the semantic information of any of the lexical items.
This temporal structure must be "coerced"
from the combination of items; that "until", as a temporal
delimitor, forces an interpretation of repeated sequence onto the
otherwise singular action of flashing.
Several cases are presented in which an otherwise unremarkable NP
is expanded so as to refer to a different pragmatically understood object.
Jackendoff does not believe that language is thought, but rather that
thought is a brain function separate from language, and which can proceed
without language. Language opens the door to additional forms of more
complex reasoning than are possible without it.
We are unaware of most sensory processing, becoming aware of only the end
result. Consciousness is this awareness of certain sensory processing results.
But which ones and what are the consequences?
The fact that we can translate a thought between different languages shows
the the thought exists separate from language. Various types of brain
malfunctions highlight this distinction. The assignment of meaningful
elements (theta roles) must be a conceptual issue, not a language issue.
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