Ray Jackendoff, 1987
Introduction
Part I The Phenomenological Mind and the Computational Mind
Chapter 1. The Phenomenological Mind
1.1 Varieties of Experience
1.2 Positions on the Mind-Body Problem
1.3 Externalization, Form, Qualia, and the Unconscious
Chapter 2. The Computational Mind
2.1 The Computer Analogy
2.2 Attractions of the Computational Mind: Theory I
2.3 The Mind-Mind Problem
2.4 Positions on the Mind-Mind Problem: Theory II
2.5 Corollaries of Theory II
Chapter 3. Preliminaries to Descrption of the Computational Mind
3.1 Justification of the Computational Mind
3.2 Computational Theories and Computer Theories
Chapter 4. Forms of Information
4.1 Structure and Process
4.2 The Importance of Structure to Language and Memory
4.3 A Constraint on Syntactic Structure
4.4 Lashley's Observation: Theory III
4.5 Levels of Structure
4.6 The Disunity of Awareness: Theory IV
Part II The Language Faculty and What It Expresses
Chapter 5. Levels of Linguistic Structure
5.1 Phonological Structure
5.2 The Psychological Reality of Formalism
5.3 The Relation of Phonological Structure to Lower Levels
5.4 Syntactic Structure
5.5 Transformations and Processing
5.6 Phonological Segmentation: Intonation and Stress
5.7 Correspondence Rules and the Lexicon
5.8 Summary
5.9 Language Acquisition and Innateness
Chapter 6. Language Processing
6.1 The Logical Structure of Language Perception and Production
6.2 Holistic and Top-Down Influences in Language Understanding
6.3 Lexical Access During Speech Perception
6.4 The Time Course of Language Production
6.5 Bidirectionality in the Language Processor
6.6 Levels of Representation in Short-Term Linguistic Memory
6.7 The Function of Short-Term Linguistic Memory
6.8 The Selection Function of Short-Term Linguistic Memory
6.9 Summary: Theory V-A
Chapter 7. Boundary Conditions on Conceptual Structure
7.1 Meaning as a Component of the Computational Mind
7.2 Connections to Other Faculties
7.3 Approaches Ruled Out by the Mentalistic Postulate
7.4 Reference and Intentionality
7.5 Truth
Chapter 8. Some Elements of Conceptual Structure
8.1 Categorization
8.2 The Noncategorical Nature of Categorization
8.3 Preference Rule Systems
8.4 Ontological Claims: Some Major Categories of Concepts
8.5 Generalization of Spatial Concepts to Abstract Domains
8.6 Final Remarks
Part III Nonlinguistic Faculties
Chapter 9. Levels of Visual Structure
9.1 The Problem of Vision
9.2 The Form of Marr's Inquiry into Vision
9.3 The Primal Sketch and the 2 1/2 D Sketch
9.4 The 3D Model
9.5 Visual Imagery and the Imagery Debate
9.6 Remarks on Visual Processing
Chapter 10. The Connection between Language and Vision
10.1 Preliminary Correspondences
10.2 The 3D Model as a Central Representation
10.3 Visual Identification and Categorization
10.4 The Use of 3D Models in Word Meanings
10.5 Enriching the Conceptual-3D Connection
10.6 Summary
10.7 Special-Purpose Capacities that Draw on Vision
Chapter 11. Levels of Musical Structure
11.1 What Is Musical Cognition?
11.2 Tonal Systems
11.3 The Musical Surface
11.4 Grouping and Metrical Structure
11.5 Time-Span and Prolongational Reductions
11.6 Musical Understanding versus Linguistic and Visual Understanding
11.7 Musical Understanding and Musical Performance
11.8 Musical Affect: Toward a Level of Body Representation
11.9 Remarks on Musical Processing
Chapter 12. The Modularoty of the Computational Mind
12.1 Summary of the Levels
12.2 Hierachies and Headed Hierarchies
12.3 Fundamental Computational Principles
12.4 Larger-Scale Commonalities across Language and Music
12.5 What Part of Music is Specifically Musical?
12.6 General Characteristics of the Processors
12.7 Fodor's Modularity Thesis
12.8 A Finer-Grained View of Modularity
12.9 Central Processes
12.10 Acquisition of Modules: Innateness versus Learning
12.11 Summary
12.12 Perception and Cognition
Part IV The Phenomenological Mind and the Computational Mind, continued
Chapter 13. Processing Precursors to Consciousness
13.1 Reviews of Theories I - III
13.2 The Role of Modality-Specific Levels: Review of Theory IV
13.3 Short-Term Memory and the Selection Function: Theory V
13.4 The Role of Attention in Awareness: Theory VI
Chapter 14. The Intermediate-Level Theory of Consciousness
14.1 Some Theories of the Form of Awareness
14.2 The Form of Linguistic Awareness: Theory VII
14.3 The Form of Musical Awareness
14.4 The Form of Awareness in Visual Perception
14.5 The Form of Awareness in Visual Imagery: Theory VII Generalized
14.6 Remarks on "Sensation," Touch, Pain, Hunger, and the Self
14.7 The Unity of Entities in Awareness
Chapter 15. Amplifications of the Intermediate-Level Theory
15.1 The Affects: Theory VIII
15.2 How Is Introspection Possible?
Chapter 16. Closing Thoughts
16.1 Inexpressible Thoughts and Knowledge
16.2 How Does Language Aid Thought?
16.3 Last Overview
Appendix A: A Second Correspondence Rule between Intonation and Syntax
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